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Abstract
It is a well established fact that electricity use increases with income.
What is less well known is that - despite the positive correlation between
electricity use and income - a signicant portion of low-income households
consume very large amounts of electricity.
In this paper, we make a rst step towards better understanding this
phenomenon. Specically, we test the hypothesis that the high electricity
use is driven by the fact that low-income households nd it di¢ cult to
purchase heating oil upfront/in bulk and so use electricity to heat their
homes.
Using data from the Northern Ireland Continuous Household Survey
and Living Cost and Food Survey, we show that an exogenous increase
in income leads to an increase (decrease) in the probability that low-
income households use oil (electricity) for heating by approximately 40
(30) percentage points. In addition, we provide evidence which is at odds
with a set of alternative explanations for our ndings.
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1 Introduction
With rising costs of elements in electricity production and distribution and
a growing concern regarding the threat of climate change, policy makers are
increasingly becoming aware that retail energy prices will have to rise to reect
the full cost of consumption.
At the same time, there is concern that higher energy prices are going to
disproportionally impact the poor. The tension between the need for high en-
ergy prices on the one hand and the vulnerability of low-income households
on the other, has led the Northern Ireland utility regulator (NIAUR) to exam-
ine (among other things) di¤erent types of social tari¤sfor the electric utility
industry (NIAUR, 2010).
One type of tari¤ which is frequently debated in this context is a two-part
tari¤: The idea of this tari¤ is to provide a subsidized price for low levels of
consumption with the subsidy cost recovered in the pricing of larger levels of
electricity use. As an illustration, Figure 1 below shows a hypothetical two-part
tari¤ for Northern Ireland. It shows a price below the current at rate tari¤ up
to 200 KWh per month and a higher price thereafter.1
1Please note that the two-part tari¤ implies an increasing marginal price for electricity.
That is, a customer whose consumption level puts him or her on the higher tier (above 200
KWh in the example) would still pay the lower-tier rates for consumption up to the threshold
to the higher tier.
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Figure 1: A hypothetical two-part tari¤ for Northern Ireland.
The central assumption underlying this type of tari¤ is that low-income
households also have low electricity consumption. While this assumption is
generally true (i.e. there is a positive correlation between income and electricity
use) ca 20% of households in Northern Ireland with an annual income of £ 20,000
or less consume more than 375 KWh per month which is, their consumption
lies in the top quartile of all households.2
In this paper, we make a rst step towards better understanding this phe-
nomenon. Specically, we test the hypothesis that the high electricity use is
driven (at least in part) by the fact that a large part of low-income households
is not able to purchase heating oil upfront/in bulk and so has to use electricity
to heat their homes.
Testing this hypothesis is important: If low income households are forced to
use electricity to heat their homes, it is likely that these households will nd it
di¢ cult to substitute away from electricity use after a change in tari¤ structure
resulting in higher bills under a two-part tari¤. In addition, if we nd evidence
for our hypothesis, this suggests that there might be other ways to reduce the
electricity bills of low-income households such as by helping them nance the
2Data: 2008/2009 Continuous Household Survey. We drop households with zero household
income - to avoid problems with regard to non-response.
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purchase of heating oil.
The paper is divided into seven parts: In the second part, we explore what
drives high electricity use among low-income households. In the third part,
we motivate our main hypothesis. In the fourth part, we develop an empirical
strategy to test our hypothesis. We present the main ndings from our analysis
and evidence which is at odds with a set of alternative explanations in the
fth and sixth part of the paper. The seventh part concludes, spells out policy
implications and outlines next steps.
2 What drives high electricity use among low
income households?
In this section, we explore what drives high electricity use among low-income
households. We proceed in two steps:
 We rst estimate the quantitative relationship between electricity use and
a set of household background characteristics
 We then explore to what extent the prevalence of these characteristics
varies across di¤erent levels of income.
The underlying idea of this approach is that for a variable to explain a
signicant part of the high electricity use among low income households, we
expect it i) to be statistically signicantly related to high electricity use and ii)
to be more prevalent among low-income households.
2.1 What drives high electricity use?
We start our analysis with a simple empirical exercise: we regress electricity
use on a set of household characteristics  such as household demographics,
household size, housing type and income level.
In order not to impose a particular functional form on the relationship be-
tween electricity use and income, we use a semi-parametric specication of our
model of the following form:
ei = g(xi) + zi + "i (1)
where ei stands for electricity use of household i; xi is household income; zi
are household characteristics (which are added in a linear way) and "i is an iid
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mean-zero error term such that Var[ejx; z]=2". We estimate our model using
the di¤erencingmethod discussed by Yatchev (1998, 2003).3
Our data comes from the 2008/2009 Northern Ireland Continuous Household
Survey (CHS). The CHS is a voluntary sample survey of private household. The
basic unit of the survey is the household. Each individual aged 16 or over in the
household is interviewed. The survey covers questions on population, housing,
employment, education and health.
Around 4,500 households are selected each year for the CHS. 2,632 house-
holds co-operated fully in 2008/2009  giving a response rate of 58 per cent.
Table 2 provides summary statistics of our sample. It shows the number of
observations in our sample and mean values of the key variables. (Variables
marked with a * take on a value of either 0 or 1 for each household).4
3See also Alan et al (2002, 2003) and Mesnard and Ravallion (2001)
4To deal with problems of non-response, we exclude households with zero income. To
ensure the robustness of our estimates we exclude households with an income >50,000.
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Summary Statistics
Number of Observations 1,773
Electr. Consumption (quarterly) 747.7
(545.5)
Age (HRP) 50.9
(18.3)
Household Income 22,104
(23,912)
Labour Market Status* 0.38
(Inactive=1) (0.49)
Housing Type* (Detached=1) 0.38
(0.49)
Electric Heating* (EH=1) 0.24
(0.43)
Number of Rooms 5.73
(1.82)
Ownership* (Rent=1) 0.31
(0.46)
Number of Adults 1.99
(0.96)
Number of Children 0.55
(0.98)
Env. Attitude* (No Concern=1) 0.19
(0.39)
Table 2: Background Characteristics
Table 3 below gives the estimates of our background characteristics on house-
hold electricity use (i.e. the estimates of  in equation 1). It shows that electric-
ity use tends to be higher in larger houses; houses which are detached; houses
occupied by more people and by older people. The table also shows that on
average using electricity for heating is associated with a signicantly higher
electricity use (by ca 210 KWh per quarter).
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Coe¢ cient
Age HRP 23.56***
(9.03)
Age HRP^2 -0.23***
(0.09)
LM Status* (Inactive=1) 4.08
(42.48)
Housing Type* (Det=1) 86.76**
(36.53)
Electric Heating* (EH=1) 213.63***
(33.81)
Number of Rooms 23.90**
(11.51)
Ownership* (Rent=1) -41.34
(37.71)
Number of Adults 106.30***
(20.00)
Number of Children 113.32***
(18.26)
Env. Attitude* (No Concern=1) 12.42
(36.96)
Signicance HH Income V=1.336 P>jVj=0.09
Table 3: Semi-parametric Euler estimation
In Figure 2, we plot the estimated relationship between electricity use and
household income.
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Figure 2: Conditional Engel Curve
The gure shows a positive relationship between electricity use and income
 conditional on the variables in Table 3. That is, the gure shows that, all
else equal, higher levels of income are typically associated with higher levels of
electricity use.
2.2 Low Income Households
One reason why despite the positive relationship between income and elec-
tricity use electricity use may be very high for some low-income households
is that one or more background characteristics which are positively associated
with electricity use are relatively prevalent among households with low levels of
income.
The idea is that if, say, having a child increases electricity use, but it is
mostly low-income households which have children, then having a child is a
likely driver for the high electricity use among low income households (relative
to that of all households). In Figure 3, we plot the prevalence of our background
characteristics by income using local linear regressions to smooth the data.
To save space, we only show gures for characteristics which were signicant
in Table 3. (Plots for all other variables can be found in Appendix A).
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Figure 3: Distribution of background characteristics over household income
The gures show that among the main background variables in our model
 only being above 60 and using electricity for heating are signicantly more
prevalent among low levels of income. This  together with the nding that
both variables are associated with a signicantly higher electricity use suggests
that they are important drivers of the high electricity use among low income
households.5
In the following we focus on the second background characteristic which
5We have (implicitly) assumed that the e¤ects of our background variables on electricity
consumption are the same across di¤erent levels of income. This need not be the case. To
explore (possible) di¤erences in our impact estimates, we plot the (conditional) relationship
between household income and electricity use as before but now separately for di¤erent values
of our background characteristics. (See Appendix A for details). Our plots are consistent with
the main conclusion in this section.
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is use of electric heating.
3 Why so much Electric Heating?
In the last section, we presented evidence that the widespread use of electric
heating plays an important role for the high electricity use among low-income
households. This poses the question: why is heating by means of electricity so
popular among low-income households?
There are several possible explanations. These include that low-income
households:
 Tend to live in houses with electric central heating.
 Have no working central heating and so have to use electric fan heaters
etc.
 Have a working central heating system but cannot a¤ord purchasing heat-
ing oil upfront/in bulk.
 Find it more e¢ cient to heat (parts of the house) with an electric heater
compared to using a central heating system.
In the following, we focus on the third possible explanation which is that
electric heating is widely used among low-income households because these
households nd it di¢ cult to purchase heating oil upfront/in bulk.
The background to this is that ca 75% of dwellings in Northern Ireland (89%
in rural areas) have an oil central heating and oil typically has to be purchased
upfront and in bulk.6
6Data: NI House Condition Survey 2006. See Frey et al (2007).
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Figure 4: Distribution of dwellings over central heating systems.
We focus on this explanation, because it seems more plausible than explana-
tions one and two: Figure 4 gives the distribution of dwellings across di¤erent
types of central heating. It shows that only ca 5% of dwellings in Northern
Ireland have an electricity central heating.7
Similarly, in case of explanation two, ca 98% of dwellings in Northern Ireland
have (some form of) central heating. In addition, only 1.3% of central heatings
are defective  88% of which are in non-occupied dwellings. This makes it
unlikely that the widespread use of electricity for heating is due primarily to
the absence of a working central heating system.
Explanation four is more plausible. We will return to it in sections 5.4.
3.1 A simple Theoretical Model
In this section, we spell out our (liquidity constraint) argument in more detail
by means of a simple model. Our model is based on Fishers theory of inter-
temporal consumption.8
Take a representative individual. Suppose her decision horizon spans one
7This number is marginally larger for low-income households.
8Fisher (1930); Creedy (1994)
11
year a realistic assumption for most low-income households9 which we divide
into two periods: period 1 (summer and autumn) and period 2 (winter and
spring). Further assume all our individual is interested in is to heat her home
in period 2. She can do so using either oil or electricity. We take capital stock
as given.10
If our individual uses oil to heat her home she has to purchase whatever
amount she needs upfront (i.e. in period 1). If she uses electricity, she can pay
as she goes (i.e. in period 2). Suppose our consumer earns after-tax income
Y1 in period 1 and Y2 in period 2. Further assume (for the moment) that our
individual has the opportunity to borrow and save. From these assumptions we
can derive a standard inter-temporal budget constraint:
S1 +
S2
1+r = Y1 +
Y2
1+r (2)
If the real interest rate (r) is zero, all the budget constraint says is that total
spending on oil and electricity (S1 and S2) in the two periods is equal to total
income in the two periods. In the usual case in which the interest rate is greater
than zero, electricity expenditure and future income are discounted by a factor
of 1 + r.
The second part of our model concerns the preferences of our consumer. We
assume that her objective function is her utility over the two heating fuels i.e.
U(C1) + U(C2) (3)
Where C1 is consumption of heating oil; C2 consumption of electricity and
u(.) is the instantaneous utility function.  is the discount factor.
We assume that C1 = S1 and C2 = S2. That is, our consumer uses all the
fuel she purchases. Because we assume that consumption of both fuels takes
place in period 2, we can set  = 1.
Optimisation of our consumers objective function subject to her inter-temporal
budget constraint gives an optimal combination of oil and electricity expendi-
ture. The optimum is characterised by the following condition:
U 0(C1)
U 0(C2)
= (1 + r) (4)
It says that at the optimum, the Marginal Rate of Substitution is equal to
the Marginal Rate of Transformation or the slope of our consumers optimal
9See e.g. Harvey et al (2007) p.41
10We will come back to this assumption in section 5.3.
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indi¤erence curve is the same as that of her (inter-temporal) budget constraint.
The idea is illustrated in Figure 5a below  where point O marks the best
combination of oil and electricity.11
Figure 5a: Optimal spending on Figure 5b: Optimal spending given
Oil/Electricity liquidity constraints.
So far, we have assumed that our consumer can borrow (as well as save).
The ability to borrow allowed her to spend more on oil than her period 1 income.
Yet, for many people such borrowing is not possible (or only at substantially
higher rates).12
Formally, this situation translates into a further constraint in our optimisa-
tion problem which is:
S1   Y1  0 (5)
It can be shown relatively easily that this additional constraint (when bind-
ing) leads to higher spending on electricity.13
The idea is illustrated in Figure 5b above: The liquidity constraint translates
into a kinked budget constraint. As a result (of this change in the shape of the
budget constraint), our consumer can no longer choose point Obut has to
settle for point E (where E lies above and to the left of point O).
3.2 Minimum Purchase Requrirement
Let us add one more complication to the model. Suppose there is a minimum
purchase amount for oil. In Northern Ireland, this lies at around £ 200. This
complication leads to four possible situations. Our consumer can be:
11Note that, under non-satiating preferences, the solution must lie on the inter-temporal
budget constraint.
12For simplicity, we subsume both cases under the term liquidity constrained
13This leads to the following optimisation problem: L = u(C1) + u(C2) + 1(Y1 + Y2=(1 +
r)  C1 + C2=(1 + r)) + 2(Y1   C1)
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 Not liquidity constrained and not constrained by the minimum purchase
amount for oil
 Not liquidity constrained but constrained by the minimum purchase amount
for oil
 Liquidity constrained but not constrained by the minimum purchase amount
for oil or
 Liquidity constrained and constrained by the minimum purchase amount
for oil.
We discuss the four situations in turn: As we have seen earlier already,
in the simplest case, when our consumer is not liquidity constrained and not
constrained by a minimum purchase amount for oil, she chooses electricity and
oil at point O. This is illustrated in Figure 6a below (again).
Figure 6a: Optimal spending given Figure 6b: Optimal spending given
no liqu. const. & no min. purch. amt. binding minimum purchase amount
In the second situation where the minimum purchase amount for oil is
higher than her desired spending on oil our consumer ends up spending more
on oil and less on electricity than she would otherwise. This is illustrated in
Figure 6b. It shows that the best our consumer can do  given a binding
minimum purchase amount  is to consume at point D (where point D lies
below and to the right of point O).
The opposite happens (to electricity and oil spending), if our consumer is
liquidity constrained but not constrained by a minimum purchase amount for oil:
In this case, our consumer ends up spending less on oil and more on electricity
than she would want ideally. Given her liquidity constraint the best she can do
is to consume at point E in Figure 7a where E is above and to the left of point
O.
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Figure 7a: Optimal spending given Figure 7b: Optimal spending given
binding liquidity constraint liquidity const. & min purchase amt.
We get the most extreme distribution of spending on oil and electricity in
the fourth situation which is when our consumer is liquidity constrained and
constrained by a minimum purchase amount for oil. As shown in Figure 7b, the
best our consumer can do in this situation is to consume at point F, where F
implies zero oil expenditure and a maximum expenditure on electricity.
What this suggests is that (also) a combination of liquidity constraints and
a binding minimum purchase amount for oil can explain the high use of electric
heating among low income households. The intuition is that low-income house-
holds facing liquidity constraints and a minimum purchase amount may nd it
di¢ cult to purchase heating oil upfront and in bulk and so end up substituting
electricity for oil when it comes to heating their homes.
In the following, we derive a series of implications from this model and test
whether they stand up to the data.
4 Testing for Liquidity Constraints
One way of testing the role of liquidity constraints or a combination of liquidity
constraints and a binding minimum purchase requirement for the widespread use
of electric heating among low-income households, is to look at what happens
if we give a random set of households enough money to purchase heating oil
(compared to a set of households which does not receive this money).
The underlying idea is that our model suggests a di¤erent response to such a
cash transfer in terms of oil expenditure and electricity expenditure on heating
depending on whether a household is liquidity constrained; faces a binding
minimum purchase amount; both; or neither. To see this, we go through the
di¤erent situations in turn.
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To determine the response to a cash transfer, we have to make an assumption
about whether we consider electricity and oil heating normal goodsor inferior
goods. A normal goodis one where an increase in income typically leads to
an increase in consumption while an inferior goodis one where the opposite
is true.
While oil heating is a normal good, the literature is not clear whether
electric heating is (See Wills, 1981 and Halvorsen, 2001). In the following,
we assume that electric heating (too) is a normal good. We will discuss the
possibility that it is an inferior goodlater together with the corresponding
consequences for our empirical strategy (see section 5.4).14
Given this assumption: What is the implication of an (exogenous) increase
in income when our consumer is not liquidity constrained and not constrained
by a minimum purchase amount?
Figure 8a: Optimal response to Figure 8b: Optimal response given
income shock - no constraint binding minimum purchase amount
The answer is: our consumer will increase spending on both oil and elec-
tricity. This is illustrated in Figure 8a above. First note that an increase in
either Y1 or Y2 shifts the budget constraint outward. This shift leads to a shift
in optimal spending from point O to point O(above and to the right of point
O).
What happens if our consumer is not liquidity constrained, but the mini-
mum purchase amount is binding? In this case, our consumer leaves her oil
expenditure unchanged, while increasing her expenditure on electricity. Figure
8b above shows how the shift in the budget constraint leads to a shift in optimal
spending from point D to Dwhere Dlies exactly above point D.
14Please note that the upward sloping Engel Curve from section 2.1 does not help us decide
whether electric heating is a normal or inferior good. The estimation used total electricity
expenditure (rather than expenditure on electric heating only)  and so does not allow any
conclusions about the nature of the relationship between electric heating and income.
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The e¤ect of an (exogenous) increase in income, if our consumer is liquidity
constrained but not constrained by a minimum purchase amount, is illustrated
in Figure 9a below. It shows that, in this situation, our consumer responds to
the change in income by increasing her spending on oil while leaving electricity
spending unchanged. Her optimal point moves from point E to point E.
Figure 9a: Optimal response given Figure 9b: Optimal response given
binding liquidity constraint liquidity const. & min purchase amt.
Finally, when our consumer is both liquidity constrained and constrained by
a minimum purchase amount, an increase in income (which is large enough for a
minimum purchase of oil) leads to a reduction in spending on electricity and an
increase in spending on oil. The intuition is that our consumer can now a¤ord
to purchase oil and so to cut electricity. The situation is shown in Figure 9b.
The optimal point moves from F to point F.
Table 4 summarises the di¤erent implications of an (exogenous) increase in
income for the spending behaviour of our consumer. It shows that depending
on whether we assume our consumer to be liquidity constrained; constrained
by a minimum purchase amount; both; or neither, our model yields di¤erent
implications in terms of oil and electricity expenditure for heating.
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Model Oil Expenditure Elec. Expenditure
No Liquidity Constraint/ + +
No Minimum Purch. Am.
No Liquidity Constraint/ No Change +
Minimum Purch. Am.
Liquidity Constraint/ + No Change
No Minimum Purch. Am.
Liquidity Constraint/ + -
Minimum Purch. Am.
Table 4: Summary Testable Hypotheses
What this suggests is that: assuming that our consumer is representative
for all (low-income) households in Northern Ireland, we can test for liquidity
constraints/a combination of liquidity constraints and a binding minimum pur-
chase amount simply by looking at how households respond to an (exogenous)
increase in income.
In the next section, we discuss how we go about doing so.
4.1 Regression Discontinuity
To test how an (exogenous) increase in income actually changes oil and electric-
ity spending for heating, ideally, we would randomly allocate individuals into a
treatment group and a control group.
Individuals in the treatment group would receive £ 250 (which is slightly
more than the average minimum purchase amount for oil) while individuals
in the control group would receive nothing. Because of the random allocation
into treatment and control, we could be sure that whatever happens to oil and
electricity expenditure would be due to this payment.
Luckily, we do not have to implement such an experiment: it turns out that
the payment of Winter Fuel Paymentby the government provides a natural
experiment. Winter Fuel Payment is a one-time lump sum cash transfer of
£ 250 which is not taxable nor means tested. It is paid to all households with
at least one household member aged 60 or over. Take up is near 100%.
To see how a treatment e¤ectof receiving £ 250 can be identied from this
payment, notice that within a small interval around the cut-o¤age the allocation
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of Winter Fuel Payment is very similar to a randomized experiment. That is,
because it is unlikely that there is something systematically di¤erent between
people age 59 and 60, we can interpret individuals just above 60 as treatment
group, while individuals just below the cut-o¤ age as control group.15
A practical problem with this approach is that, in a given sample, we typ-
ically have only a few observations near the cut-o¤ point. This makes it hard
to get robust estimates. One way of dealing with this problem is by increasing
the interval around the cut-o¤ point (comparing e.g. individuals age 55-59 with
individuals age 60-64). Yet, this is likely to produce a bias in the e¤ect estimate
(since individuals age 55 are most certainly di¤erent from individuals age 64).
A better approach is to make an assumption about the functional form of
the relationship between age and oil/electricity expenditure on either side of the
cut-o¤ point. This double extrapolation combined with the exploitation of the
randomised experimentaround the cut-o¤point forms the basis of a regression
discontinuitydesign which is our approach to test the role of liquidity con-
straints/a combination of liquidity constraints and a minimum purchase amount
with regard to the use of electric heating among low-income households.16
4.2 A Note on the Data
For our estimation, we use data from the Continuous Household Survey (CHS)
for 2008/2009. It is the largest dataset which includes information on spending
on oil and electricity for Northern Ireland. A shortcoming of the CHS data is
that it does not distinguish between oil/electricity expenditure for heating and
oil/electricity expenditure for other uses.
One way of dealing with this problem is to use aggregate expenditure on oil
and electricity which includes both heating and other uses. The problem is
that this may not allow us to detect our hypothesised e¤ect: To the extent that
spending on heating makes up only a (small) part of aggregate expenditure on
oil/electricity, the change in spending on heating (as a result of receiving Winter
Fuel Payment) may not be large enough to be detectable using aggregate data.17
15Beatty et al (forthcoming) use a similar approach to estimate the e¤ect of Winter Fuel
Payment on the trade o¤ between heat and eat.
16RD designs have been implemented in a wide range of contexts. See e.g. Card, Shore-
Sheppard (2004); Carpenter, Dobkin (2009); Chen, Shapiro. (2004); Malamud, Pop-Eleches
(2010)
17This problem is particularly severe in the CHS. The CHS is sampled over the course of
a year. As a result, heating is likely to play a minor role for the reported (weekly/monthly)
expenditure of a large part of the sample.
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In addition, even if the change in heating expenditure is large enough to be
detectable, using aggregate data, we will not be able to exclude the possibility
that the changes we observe are driven (at least in part) by uses of oil/electricity
other than heating. As an example, we will not be able to exclude that a decrease
in aggregate electricity expenditure is driven by the fact that households use
their Winter Fuel Payment to buy a more e¢ cient fridge/freezer.18
An alternative way of dealing with the lack of data on heating expenditure
is by exploiting the information on whether households use oil/electricity for
heating (or not). The CHS provides this information.19 It is a good alternative
to using aggregate expenditure data in particular if we focus on the hypothesis
that the widespread use of electric heating is due to a combination of liquidity
constraints and a binding minimum purchase amount (rather than just liquidity
constraints).
The idea is that our model with liquidity constraints and a minimum pur-
chase amount is the only one which suggests a signicant increase in the prob-
ability that a household uses oil as a heating fuel (and is compatible with a
signicant decrease in the probability that a household uses electricity as a
heating fuel):
The (direct) implication of our model is that our consumer starts using oil for
heating (and decreases her spending on electricity). This suggests that, if we nd
a signicant increase in the probability that households use oil (and, depending
on the optimal amount of electricity use, a decrease in the probability that
households use electricity) this provides evidence for the existence of liquidity
constraints and a binding minimum purchase amount.
Heating Mode # of obs: oil # of obs: electricity
Primary, Secondary, or 1,711 497
Tertiary Use
Table 5: Sampel Size by Heating type20
A second potential problem for our analysis is that one of our key identica-
18This is particularly problematic, because we may get very di¤erent predictions for the
directions of an e¤ect for uses other than heating.
19The CHS asks people about their primary, secondary; and tertiary heating fuel. It also
asks about fuel number six, seven, eight, nine and ten. However the number of responses are
negligible after: fuel number three.
20The sample can be further broken down as follows: 3 rooms: 102 observations; 4 rooms:
316 observations; pre-payment customers: 520 observations; households with no environmental
concern: 368 observations; households renting from the Housing Executive: 216 observations;
households with a female household head: 705 observations; households living in a detached/
semi-detached building: 833
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tion assumptions may not hold. The assumption is that payment of Winter Fuel
Payment is the only discrete change at age 60. One reason why this may not
be the case is that 60 is the o¢ cial pension age for women in Northern Ireland
(while the pension age for men is 65). In order not to confound our estimates
with the e¤ect of retirement on fuel expenditure:
 We dene a reference ageas the age of the older one of the household
reference person and his/her spouse;21 and
 Drop households from our sample for which the reference ageis between
60 and 62 and the older one of the household reference person and his/her
spouse is retired.
We show in section 6.3 that reducing our sample in this way e¤ectively deals
with the problem of retirement at age 60. To limit our sample (as much as
possible) to households with an oil central heating, we also exclude households
with a gas central heating from our sample.22 In addition, we exclude households
with an electricity consumption of <1 KWh/day.23
A nal problem we have to address is the fact that our data tells us the age
of a household member in years in the sampling month only (i.e. when he/she
was interviewed). This means that we do not know if someone who was sampled
in, say, December just turned 60 or whether he/she was 60 at the date of the
qualifying week for Winter Fuel Payment (in late September) already.
We deal with this problem by estimating our treatment e¤ect with and with-
out households for which we are not sure whether they have actually received
Winter Fuel Payment.
4.3 Empirical Framework
In this section, we dene our empirical strategy more formally. Consider the
regression model:
Yi = Xi + TREATi + f(age) + "i (6)
21The number of households with an additional old family member  with a household
head age 60/65 are negligible.
22We do not know the type of central heating. Instead, we drop households which report
using gas a primary, secondary or tertiary heating fuel.
23Gas is typically paid ex post so gas customers do not t our model. We exclude house-
holds with electricity use < 1 KWh/day, because a refrigerator typically uses 1-2 KWh/day-
which makes it implausible that an occupied primary residence would fall below 1 KWh/day.
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where Yi is our outcome variable  i.e. whether or not a household uses
oil/electricity for heating. Xi represents a set of control variables which we
include to increase precision of our estimates.24 TREATi is a treatment dummy
that captures the e¤ect of Winter Fuel Payment at age 60. TREATi is dened
as:
TREATi =
(
0 if a < 60
1 if a  60
Finally, f(age) is a smooth function of age. A critical question for imple-
menting our strategy is how to model f(age). To ensure the robustness of our
ndings we consider both parametric and non-parametric functions of age.
For our parametric specications, we focus on linear and (conditional) cubic
models using splines. For our non-parametric specications, we follow Hahn
et al (2001) and Porter (2003) by using local linear regressions to estimate
the treatment e¤ect. We estimate this in one step using a simple rectangular
kernel.25
Given the absence of a widely agreed upon method for selecting an optimal
bandwidth, we follow Ludwig and Miller (2007) and present results for a range
of candidate bandwidth. Our preferred estimates are based on a bandwidth
of 5 which we calculate using the Imbens-Kalyanaram optimal procedure.26
However, we also consider bandwidths that are twice and half the size of our
preferred bandwidth.27
5 Main Results
In this section, we provide the main results from our regression discontinuity. We
report our results for two di¤erent groups: a Low Income Group with household
income below the median (£ 20,000) and a High Income Group with a household
income above the median (£ 20,000).28
24They have little e¤ect on our estimates of the discontinuity.
25Although a triangular kernel has been shown to be boundary optimal (by putting more
weight on observations closer to the cut-o¤ point), Lee and Lemieux (2009) argue that a more
transparent way of putting more weight on observations close to the cut-o¤ is to estimate a
model with a rectangular kernel using smaller bandwidths. See also Malamud, Pop-Eleches
(2010).
26 Imbens, Kalyanaram (2009). The IK bandwidth varies for di¤erent estimations. It lies
between 2 and 6.
27 I am grateful to Ofer Malamud in helping me with the implementation of the non-
parametric specication.
28We drop households with zero income.
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We display graphs of our main outcomes using local linear regressions with
a bandwidth of 5. All our regressions include number of children and labour
market status as controls.
5.1 Electric Heating and Oil Heating
We begin our analysis by displaying the e¤ect of receiving Winter Fuel Payment
on the probability of using oil heating for households in our Low Income Group
in Figure 10a and Table 6 (column 1).
The open circles plot the residuals from regressions of the dependent variable
(using oil heating) on a set of controls for 1 year age intervals. The solid lines are
tted values of residuals from local linear regressions. The vertical line marks
age 60. Households to the left of the vertical line do not receive Winter Fuel
Payment, households to the right do.
Figure 10a: RD oil heating Low- Figure 10b: RD elect. heating Low-
Income Group Income Group
A striking feature of the gure is that the probability of a household to
use oil as a heating fuel appears to be a continuous and smooth function of
age everywhere, except at the threshold that determines whether a household
receives Winter Fuel Payment or not.29 There is a large discontinuous jump in
the probability that a household uses oil to heat its home at age 60.
The size of the jump is relatively large and statistically signicant. Table
6 Column 1 shows that a household which receives Winter Fuel Payment is
approximately 40 percentage points more likely to use oil as a heating fuel. In
Figure 10b, we plot the same relationship (as in Figure 10a) but now for the
probability that a household uses electricity to heat their home.
What we nd is the mirror image to Figure 10a: The share of households
using electricity as a heating fuel drops at age 60. The change is just about
29We will test this more formally in section 6.3.
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statistically signicant. This is likely to be due to the fact that households
continue to use some electric heating even after starting to use oil. However, as
we will discuss in section 6.2, our estimates hide some important heterogeneity
across households.
In the next Figures (Figure 11a and 11b), we plot the same relationships for
our High Income Group. Figure 11a shows the probability that a household uses
oil for heating; Figure 11b the corresponding probability for using electricity.
The vertical lines mark age 60. As would be expected, we nd no signicant
change in the probability of using oil or electricity for heating.
Columns 3 and 4 of Table 6 provide the corresponding quantitative estimates.
Figure 11a: RD oil heating High- Figure 11b: RD elect heating High-
Income Group Income Group
Intuitively, households in our High Income Group are unlikely to face prob-
lems nancing the purchase of heating oil (upfront/in bulk). So, it is not sur-
prising that receiving Winter Fuel Payment does not lead to a signicant change
in the heating pattern of these households. Our results are robust to includ-
ing/excluding households for which we are not sure about the reference age.
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Low Income Group High Income Group
Oil Heating Elec Heating Oil Heating Elec Heating
Nonparam. 0.47*** -0.40* 0.02 0.19
BW=5 (0.19) (0.21) (0.11) (0.19)
Nonparam. 0.63* -0.55 0.03 0.17
BW=2.5 (0.34) (0.35) (0.17) (0.25)
Nonparam. 0.35*** -0.27 0.05 0.18
BW=7.5 (0.14) (0.16) (0.09) (0.14)
Param. 0.20** -0.22** 0.03 0.06
Linear Spline (0.09) (0.11) (0.07) (0.09)
Param. 0.20** -0.21* -0.02 0.15
Cubic Spline (0.10) (0.13) (0.09) (0.12)
Table 6: RD estimates for using oil/electricity heating
Statistically Signicant at 1% ***; 5% **; 10% *.
5.2 Selection Bias
A possible alternative explanation for the ndings in the last section is that
the changes in the probability of using oil/electricity for heating are driven
by selection issues: by dropping parts of our sample to avoid confounding our
estimates with the e¤ects of retirement at age 60, we may have introduced a
bias.
More specically, the idea is that to the extent that households with a ref-
erence agebetween 60 and 62 and a retired household member are less (more)
likely to use oil (electricity) for heating, the changes in the probability of using
oil/electric heating may simply reect the e¤ect of excluding these households
from our sample.
We test this possibility by re-doing our analysis but now using data from
before the introduction of Winter Fuel Payment: The underlying idea is that if
the changes in the probability of using oil/electricity for heating are primarily
due to selection issues, we would expect to nd the same jumps in probabilities
in a sample prior to the introduction of Winter Fuel Payment.
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Figure 12a: RD oil heating Low- Figure 12b: RD elect heating Low-
Income Group - 1997 Sample Income Group - 1997 Sample
Figure 12a and 12b show the relevant plots for the 1996/1997 sample of
the Continuous Household Survey. They show no signicant change in the
probability of a household (in our Low Income Group) to use oil/electricity for
heating. This suggests that the restrictions on our sample are unlikely to drive
the changes in the use of oil/electric heating in our 2008/2009 sample.
Table 7 sows the corresponding quantitative estimates.
Low Income Group
Oil Heating Electricity Heating
Nonparam. 0.27 -0.04
BW=5 (0.18) (0.20)
Nonparam. 0.34 -0.12
BW=2.5 (0.28) (0.30)
Nonparam. 0.27 -0.13
BW=7.5 (0.14) (0.15)
Param. 0.10 -0.20*
Linear Spline (0.10) (0.10)
Param. 0.09 -0.13
Cubic Spline (0.10) (0.09)
Table 7: RD estimates for using oil/electricity heating 1997 sample
Statistically Signicant at 1% ***; 5% **; 10% *.
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5.3 Capital Stock
So far, we have assumed that capital stock is xed. That is, we have assumed
that households are stuck with a particular type of central heating which is
oil and have no way of switching to a di¤erent system.
To the extent that households do have the possibility of changing their capital
stock e.g. by moving house or by buying a new central heating a possible
alternative explanation for the change in the probability of using oil/electricity
for heating is that it reects the decision to move house/get a new central
heating at age 60 (rather than reduced liquidity constraints).
To test this possibility, we redo our analysis this time looking at the prob-
ability of a household to have an oil/electricity central heating. Figures 13a,
13b and Table 8 show our results.30
Figure 13a: RD oil central heating Figure 13b: RD elect. central heating
Low-Income Group Low-Income Group
The gures and estimates in Table 8 do not suggest a signicant change in
the probability of a household to have an oil or electricity central heating at the
cut-o¤ point. This suggests that our assumption of taking capital stock as given
is valid and that a change in capital stock does not drive our main ndings.
30The data for our analysis comes from the 2008 Living Condition Survey. The Continuous
Household Survey does not cover the type of central heating. Because of the much smaller
sample (approximately 600 observations for NI) - we do not include controls in our estimation.
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Low Income Group
Oil Heating Electricity Heating
Nonparam. 0.33 -0.0001
BW=5 (0.27) (0.20)
Nonparam. 0.59 -0.08
BW=2.5 (0.37) (0.27)
Nonparam. 0.23 -0.02
BW=7.5 (0.23) (0.17)
Param. 0.01 0.07
Linear Spline (0.16) (0.10)
Param. -0.04 0.06
Cubic Spline (0.16) (0.10)
Table 8: RD estimates for capital stock
Statistically Signicant at 1% ***; 5% **; 10% *.
5.4 E¢ ciency and Electric Heating
Another explanation for the changes in the probability of households using
oil/electricity heating is that Winter Fuel Payment may allow some households
to heat more than one room/a few rooms.
To the extent that it is more e¢ cient to heat one room by means of electricity,
while it is more e¢ cient to heat several rooms by means of oil, the move from
heating a few rooms to heating several rooms should lead to a jump in the
probability of using oil/electricity for heating in line with the ones we observe.
One way of testing this explanation is by checking the e¤ect of Winter Fuel
Payment for households owning/renting a few rooms: If a household owns/rents
a few rooms, there should not come a point where it becomes more e¢ cient to
heat by oil. So, receiving Winter Fuel Payment should not lead to a jump in the
probability of using oil/electricity for heating if the reason for using electricity
is e¢ ciency.
If, on the other hand, households use electric heating because they are liquid-
ity constrained we would expect that households owning/renting a few rooms
switch to oil heating as soon as they can a¤ord doing so (just as households
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owning/renting several rooms). We test the e¤ect of Winter Fuel Payment for
di¤erent types of households by estimating equations in which the variable for
receiving Winter Fuel Payment is interacted with a dummy variable equal to
one if the household owns/rents a few rooms only.
In the interest of saving space and to improve the precision of our estimates,
all of the specications in this section are based on linear splines and the stan-
dard set of controls (labour market status and number of children). Tables 9
and 10 provide our estimation results. We provide estimates for households
owning/renting three rooms and four rooms. (Typically, these households have
one/two bedrooms, one kitchen and one bathroom).31
Low Income Group
Oil Heating Elec Heating
3 Rooms 4 Rooms 3 Rooms 4 Rooms
WFP 0.15* 0.15* -0.19* -0.19*
(0.09) (0.09) (0.11) (0.11)
Few Rooms -0.35*** -0.27*** 0.29*** 0.19***
(0.07) (0.04) (0.08) (0.05)
WFP * Few Rooms -0.12 -0.0002 0.02 -0.04
(0.10) (0.06) (0.12) (0.08)
Table 9: RD interaction with few rooms- Low Income Sample
Statistically Signicant at 1% ***; 5% **; 10% *.
To ensure the robustness of our ndings, we provide estimates for our Low
Income Group (Table 9) and the combined dataset of Low Income Group and
High Income Group (Table 10).
In line with our liquidity constraint argument, we nd that the interaction
is very small and statistically insignicant in all cases.32 That is, the e¤ect
of Winter Fuel Payment on the probability of using oil/electricity for heating
is no lower for households owning/renting a few rooms than for households
owning/renting several rooms.
31We include households age <40 and age>80 in our analysis in order to increase
the power of our sample.
32Please note that the coe¢ cient of WFP now gives the e¤ect of WFP for households with
more than 3 (4) rooms. The e¤ect of WFP for households with 3 (4) rooms or less is given
by the sum of the coe¢ cients of WFP and the interaction term.
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Low Income Group and High Income Group
Oil Heating Elec Heating
3 Rooms 4 Rooms 3 Rooms 4 Rooms
WFP 0.11* 0.11* -0.08 -0.08
(0.05) (0.05) (0.07) (0.07)
Few Rooms -0.38*** -0.28*** 0.29*** 0.29***
(0.05) (0.03) (0.06) (0.06)
WFP * Few Rooms -0.07 0.01 0.05 0.05
(0.08) (0.05) (0.10) (0.10)
Table 10: RD interaction with few rooms- Combined Sample
Statistically Signicant at 1% ***; 5% **; 10% *.
6 Further Results
In this section, we examine a number of additional results that build on our
main ndings. We explore whether the e¤ects of Winter Fuel Payment are medi-
ated by whether households use pre-payment electricity metering; rent from the
Northern Ireland Housing Executive and/or have strong environmental views.
We also investigate whether the e¤ects of Winter Fuel Payment are a¤ected
by household demographics  such as gender of the household head; family
status; and housing type. As before, in the interest of saving space and to
improve the precision of our estimates, we base our estimates on models with
linear splines and the standard set of controls.
6.1 Mediating Variables
To better understand the role of using pre-payment electricity metering; renting
from the NI Housing Executive and environmental attitudes on our main results,
we estimate equations in which the variable for receiving Winter Fuel Payment
is interacted with these variables.
The motivation for including a pre-payment variable in our analysis is to
test the hypothesis that households using pre-payment metering are more likely
to be liquidity constraint - and so should show a larger jump in the probability
of using oil/electricity for heating.33
33Because we are primarily intereted in the new technology, we only use keypad customers
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The underlying idea of testing for a mediating e¤ect of renting from the NI
Housing Executive is to see if the Housing Executive (successfully) addresses
the issue of liquidity constraints  e.g. by purchasing oil upfront and charg-
ing households as they goor by organising bulk purchases among households
renting from it.
Finally, we include an interaction term of Winter Fuel Payment and the
environmental attitude of the household head: To the extent that oil heating is
associated with a larger carbon footprint, we would expect to nd a smaller jump
in the probability of using oil/electricity among households with a higher level
of environmental concern. Note that our variables are potentially endogenous,
so the results of the analysis need to be interpreted with care.
Columns1/4 of Table 11 display the interaction of Winter Fuel Payment with
a variable indicating whether or not a household uses pre-payment electricity
metering. As hypothesised, the interaction is positive and signicant in the case
of oil - indicating that the e¤ect of Winter Fuel Payment on the probability of
using oil is signcaintly higher for households using pre-payment metering.
In terms of the absolute e¤ect of using pre-payment metering: Our estima-
tion results suggest that Winter Fuel Payment leads to a 18 percentage point
increase in the probability of using oil for heating for households using no pre-
payment electricity meter, while it leads to a 47 percentage point increase for
households which do use pre-payment electricity metering.
Interestingly, we do not nd a signcant di¤erence in the e¤ect of Winter
Fuel Payment on the probability that households use electricity for heating.
This suggests that many pre-payment customers keep on using electricity for
heating (as a complementary fuel) even after starting to use oil for heating.
in this category  i.e. no customers using slot meters.
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Low Income Group
Oil Heating Electric Heating
PPM Env. Att Hous. Exec PPM Env. Att Hous. Exec
WFP 0.18* 0.24*** 0.15* -0.22** -0.26** -0.22**
(0.09) (0.09) (0.09) (0.11) (0.11) (0.11)
Mediator -0.22*** -0.05 -0.29*** 0.16** -0.004 0.14***
(0.07) (0.03) (0.04) (0.08) (0.04) (0.05)
WFP* 0.29* -0.07 0.08 0.19 0.007 0.03
Mediator (0.14) (0.05) (0.07) (0.16) (0.06) (0.08)
Table 11: RD interaction with mediators
Statistically Signicant at 1% ***; 5% **; 10% *.
We do not nd a signicant di¤erence in the e¤ect of Winter Fuel Payment
on the jump in the probability of using oil/electric heating for households renting
from the NI Housing Executive. This suggets that the Housing Executive is not
e¤ective in addressing the problem of liquidity constraints among its customers.
This nding is important to the extent that our results also suggest that
households renting from the NI Housing Executive are signicantly less (more)
likely to use oil (electricity) for heating to start with. Finally, we do not nd a
mediating e¤ect of strong environmental attitudes on the e¤ect of Winter Fuel
Payment.
6.2 Heterogeneity
Table 12 below explores the di¤erential impact of household characteristics on
the e¤ect of Winter Fuel Payment on the probability that a household uses
oil/electricity for heating. We estimate equations in which Winter Fuel Payment
is interacted with gender of the household head; number of occupants; and
housing type.
Interestingly, columns 1/2 and 4/5 do not reveal any signicant di¤erences
in the e¤ect of Winter Fuel Payment for households with a male or female
household head; households with a single occupant or multiple occupants, re-
spectively. This is surprising, since there are substantial di¤erences in the mean
levels of our outcome variables (at least in the case of number of adults).
Columns 3/6 display the interaction betweenWinter Fuel Payment and hous-
ing type. What we nd is that - despite a signicant increase in the probability
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of using oil for heating - families living in a detached building are less likely to
stop using electric heating (once they receive Winter Fuel Payment).
In terms of the absolute e¤ect of living in a detached building: Our estima-
tion results suggest that Winter Fuel Payment leads to a 27 percentage point
decrease in the probability of using electricity for heating for households living
in a non-detached building, while it leads to a 8 percentage point decrease for
households which live in a detached building.
This nding is consistent with the idea that the optimal amount of electric
heating is positive for households living in large/detached houses (complement-
ing oil heating) and zero for smaller non-detached houses.
Low Income Group
Oil Heating Electric Heating
Female # of adults Detached Female # of adults Detached
WFP 0.22** 0.19* 0.19** -0.28** -0.18 -0.27***
(0.09) (0.11) (0.09) (0.11) (0.13) (0.11)
Mediator 0.005 0.05** 0.03 -0.03 -0.02 -0.14
(0.04) (0.02) (0.06) (0.05) (0.02) (0.07)
WFP* 0.02 0.01 0.06 0.07 -0.03 0.19**
Mediator (0.06) (0.04) (0.08) (0.07) (0.04) (0.09)
Table 12: RD interaction with background characteristics
Statistically Signicant at 1% ***; 5% **; 10% *.
6.3 Specication Checks
Our analysis rests on two critical assumptions: To make a valid inference
 The underlying functions (to the left and to the right of the cut-o¤ point)
need to be continuous in age
 Winter Fuel Payment must be the only source of variation a¤ecting elec-
tricity use that changes discretely at age 60
The intuition of the rst condition is that only if electricity use is a contin-
uous function in age (close to the cut-o¤ point), it seems plausible to use the
average outcome of those right below the cut-o¤ as a valid counterfactual for
those right above the cut-o¤ (See Lee and Lemieux, 2010).
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Similarly, Winter Fuel Payment has to be the only source of variation (a¤ect-
ing electricity use) that changes discretely, since otherwise it is not clear what
causes the changes in electricity use at age 60. We test the rst assumption
by plotting a series of placeboregression discontinuities. That is, in line with
treatment e¤ect literature, we test for a zero e¤ect in settings where it is known
that the e¤ect should be zero.34
Specically, what we do is, we take the subsample of households with a
reference age below 60 and test for a jump at the median of the age variable.
Splitting the subsample at the median increases the power of the test to nd
jumps. In addition, by only using observations on the left of the cut-o¤ value,
we avoid estimating the regression function at a point where it is known to have
a discontinuity.35
To implement our test, we use the same method as before. We repeat the
test for the subsample of households with a references age of 60 or older. Figures
14a to 14d show the corresponding plots.
Figure 14: Placebo RD
The gures show that in line with our rst identication assumption there
is no signicant change in the probability of a household using oil/electricity for
34See Imbens and Lemieux (2008)
35 Ibid.
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heating at the cut-o¤ points (ages 49 and 71). There are smaller changes in the
probabilities that a household uses electricity for heating, but neither of them
is statistically signicant.
While we cannot verify our second identication assumption for unobserved
characteristics, we can check whether various control variables indeed vary con-
tinuously around the cut-o¤ point. In Table 13, we provide evidence to support
this assumption. The table shows that as we compare households closer and
closer in age to the cut-o¤ point, the pre-determined characteristics of house-
holds receiving Winter Fuel Payment and those not receiving Winter Fuel Pay-
ment become more and more similar.
35
a<60 a60 50<a<60 60a<70 58<a<60 60a<62
Income Low 10,855 10,267 10,121 10,904 9,711 10,637
Inc. (4,915) (4,209) (5,021) (4,460) (5,028) (4,863)
High 46,661 36,199 49,237 39,157 52,848 47,007
Inc. (23,968) (17,179) (25,301) (20,094) (30,358) (22,420)
Retired Low 0.005 0.73 0 0.39 0 0
Inc. (0.07) (0.45) 0 (0.49) (0) (0)
High 0.002 0.55 0.01 0.30 0 0
Inc. (0.039) (0.50) (0.08) (0.46) (0) (0)
Econ. Low 0.36 0.88 0.41 0.71 0.43 0.55
Inactive Inc. (0.48) (0.33) (0.49) (0.46) (0.51) (0.51)
High 0.05 0.66 0.11 0.46 0.28 0.10
Inc. (0.23) (0.47) (0.31) (0.50) (0.45) (0.30)
# Low 5.13 5.16 5 5.39 4.90 5.48
Rooms Inc. (1.26) (1.31) (1.50) (1.21) (1.26) (1.42)
High 6.30 6.60 6.60 6.81 6.41 7.62
Inc. (1.82) (1.82) (1.82) (2.02) (1.55) (2.56)
Rent Low 0.57 0.24 0.43 0.23 0.52 0.33
Inc. (0.50) (0.43) (0.50) (0.42) (0.51) (0.48)
High 0.16 0.05 0.08 0.05 0.07 0
Inc. (0.36) (0.22) (0.28) (0.21) (0.26) (0)
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a<60 a60 50<a<60 60a<70 58<a<60 60a<62
# Low 2.60 1.47 1.89 1.68 1.81 1.81
Persons Inc. (1.54) (0.68) (1.26) (0.84) (1.63) (1.04)
High 3.23 2.24 3.01 2.35 2.76 2.62
Inc. (1.40) (0.89) (1.33) (0.91) (1.12) (0.86)
E¤. Low 0.12 0.19 0.18 0.15 0.19 0.11
Grant Inc. (0.32) (0.39) (0.38) (0.36) (0.40) (0.32)
High 0.11 0.20 0.12 0.18 0.14 0.14
Inc. (0.32) (0.40) (0.33) (0.38) (0.35) (0.36)
Pension Low 0 0.18 0 0.17 0 0.33
Credit Inc. 0 (0.38) (0) (0.38) (0) (0.48)
High 0 0.02 0 0.01 0 0
Inc. 0 (0.15) (0) (0.10) (0) (0)
Table 13: Variation in pre-determined characteristics close to the cut-o¤ point
Consider, for example, the fraction of households retired. There are sizeable
di¤erences in the sample. Averaging over the entire sample, households below
age 60 are signicantly less likely to be retired than households above age 60.
However, as we start restricting the sample to closer and closer age proles, the
di¤erences in retirement decrease.
For households that are only two years from the threshold, the di¤erences are
not statistically signicant. In only one of 9 control variables (pension credit)
do we reject the null hypothesis. The discontinuity in pension credit suggests
that we cannot exclude that part of the jump in the probability that households
use oil/electricity for heating is due to the receipt of this benet.
This is not problematic, however, since our argument is based on the idea of
a (quasi-) randomly allocated positive income shock. That is, for the purpose
of our argument, it does not matter whether our income shock comes from the
receipt of Winter Fuel Payment; pension credit or a combination of the two.
7 Conclusion and Policy Implications
In this paper, we studied the high electricity use among a large part of low-
income households. Using the ndings from a semi-parametric Engel curve
estimation and the distribution of key household characteristics across income
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levels, we suggested that electric heating is an important driver of high electricity
use among low-income households.
We hypothesised that the widespread use of electric heating among low-
income households can be explained (at least in part) by the fact that these
households nd it di¢ cult to pay for heating oil upfront/in bulk. The back-
ground to our hypothesis is the widespread use of oil central heating in Northern
Ireland. We developed a simple two-period model to motivate our hypothesis.
We used a regression discontinuity design exploiting the allocation rule of
Winter Fuel Payment to test our hypothesis. In line with our reasoning, we
found that the probability that households use oil for heating jumps up (among
households in our Low Income Group) once they receive a positive income shock.
Analogously, we found that the probability that these households use electricity
jumps down.
The jumps are equally strong for households owning/renting few rooms and
several rooms. This provides evidence that the e¤ects we observe are driven by a
combination of liquidity constraints and a binding minimum purchase amount 
rather than a higher e¢ ciency of heating few rooms with electricity and several
rooms with oil.
Several policy implications arise from our analysis:
 Introducing a two-part electricity tari¤  without addressing the prob-
lem of liquidity constraints is likely to make a large part of low-income
households worse o¤ (rather than better o¤).
 Electricity use among low-income household could be reduced signicantly
by helping these households to nance the purchase of heating oil. Pos-
sible policy instruments include special savings/loan vehicles or ways to
coordinate oil purchases.
Future research will look at the e¤ectiveness of oil stamp programmes as
used in parts of Northern Ireland in addressing the problem of liquidity con-
straints and a binding minimum purchase amount when it comes to purchasing
heating oil.
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8 Appendix A
The gures below plot the conditional relationship between household income
and electricity use - separately for di¤erent values of our background character-
istics. The plots were created using the estimation approach outlined in section
2.1.
The gures show that - if anything - the e¤ect of electric heating on electricity
use is larger for lower levels of household income.
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